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Support for a Child's Post-Majority Education*
Jeff Atkinson **
I. INTRODUCTION
Support for a child's educational expenses is governed by para-
graph 513 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage
Act.' This statute specifically allows a court to order educational
* This Article is based on materials I prepared for the March 1990 Illinois Judicial
Conference for which I was the Professor-Reporter on Domestic Relations. Since there
was a substantial period of time between the time I wrote the materials and publication of
this Article, I have updated this Article to include a review of all cases involving support
for a child's post-majority education published between 1978 and April 1991. The most
recent volume of the Northeastern Reporter (2d Series) from which I obtained cases is
Volume 567 (page 327). In addition to updating my materials, I also added to the Section
on "Constitutionality of Post-Majority Support" an analysis of a parent's liberty interest
in making decisions pertaining to support for a child's education.
** Jeff Atkinson, B.S., Northwestern University, and J.D., summa cum laude,
DePaul University College of Law, is a visiting assistant professor at Loyola University
Chicago School of Law, where he has taught Family Law as well as other subjects. For
several years, Professor Atkinson has served as Chair of the American Bar Association
Child Custody Committee and as a member of the ABA Family Advocate Editorial
Board. In addition, Professor Atkinson is the author of a two-volume treatise entitled
MODERN CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE published by the Michie Company, Charlottes-
ville, Virginia.
1. Paragraph 513 provides:
Support for Non-minor Children and Educational Expenses. The court may
award sums of money out of the property and income of either or both parties
for the support of the child or children of the parties who have attained major-
ity and are not otherwise emancipated only when such child is mentally or
physically disabled; and the application therefor may be made before or after
such child has attained majority age. The Court also may make such provision
for the education and maintenance of the child or children, whether of minor or
majority age, out of the property and income of either or both of its parents as
equity may require, whether application is made therefor before or after such
child has, or children have, attained majority age. The authority under this
Section to make provision for education and maintenance extends not only to
periods of college education or professional or other training after graduation
from high school but also to any period during which a child of the parties is
still attending high school, even though he or she attained the age of 18. In
making such awards, the court shall consider all of the relevant factors which
shall appear reasonable and necessary, including:
(a) The financial resources of both parents.
(b) The standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not
been dissolved.
(c) The financial resources of the child.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 513 (1989).
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support for a child before or after the child has reached the age of
majority. Educational support may include tuition, books, trans-
portation, health care, and reasonable living expenses, including
living expenses for a child who resides at home.2 Post-majority
support may include support for trade school education as well as
college education. Paragraph 513 allows a court to order support
for a child's education "as equity may require" and directs the
court to "consider all relevant factors which appear reasonable and
necessary, including:
(a) The financial resources of both parents,
(b) The standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the
marriage not been dissolved, and
(c) The financial resources of the child."4
This Article discusses the constitutionality of paragraph 513 of
the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act and the is-
sue of standing of parents and children who seek post-majority ed-
ucational support. The Article then discusses the three factors set
forth in paragraph 513, plus a variety of other factors considered
by courts in determining educational support for children of di-
vorced parents. The use of trusts to provide educational support
after the death of a parent is also examined.
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF POST-MAJORITY SUPPORT
The Illinois Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of
paragraph 513 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Mar-
riage Act. In Kujawinski v. Kujawinski,5 a father argued that the
statute violated principles of equal protection by requiring di-
vorced parents to pay for a child's post-majority education while
not imposing such a burden on non-divorced parents. The
supreme court stated that it did not need to reach the question of
whether a duty of educational support could be imposed on non-
divorced parents since, even if such a distinction were valid, the
obligation imposed on divorced parents "is reasonably related to a
2. In re Marriage of Pauley, 104 Ill. App. 3d 100, 104-05, 432 N.E.2d 661, 665 (4th
Dist. 1982) (listing the specified expenses except transportation and health care); see also
In re Marriage of Falat, 201 Ill. App. 3d 320, 327, 559 N.E.2d 33, 37-38 (1st Dist. 1990)
("[e]ducational expenses entitle a mother to receive reasonable living expenses in addition
to the cost of tuition and books when the children are residing at home while attending
college").
3. See In re Support of Pearson, 111 111. 2d 545, 552, 490 N.E.2d 1274, 1277 (1986),
discussed infra text accompanying notes 30-34, 45-46.
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 513 (1989).
5. 71 111. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (1978).
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legitimate legislative purpose .... It is certainly a legitimate legis-
lative purpose to minimize any economic and educational disad-
vantages to children of divorced parents."' 6 Further, the court
noted, "it is not the isolated exception" that noncustodial divorced
parents may be less willing to support their children than parents
who are not divorced.7
Although the Illinois Supreme Court and the courts of some
other states have upheld the constitutionality of statutes that re-
quire divorced parents to pay for a child's college education,8 that
view is not universal. Courts in New Jersey and Florida, for exam-
ple, have commented in dicta "that the state would have no reason-
able grounds to treat the adult children of divorced parents any
different than the adult children of married parents."9
Court-ordered support for a child's education raises another
constitutional issue that has not been addressed by Illinois courts
of review. This unexamined issue is whether court-ordered sup-
port invades a parent's due process right (or liberty interest) in
family privacy, including the right to determine support for a
child's education.
There is ample dicta regarding the rights of both parents to man-
age their children's affairs. For example, in Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld,10 which dealt with social security survivor's benefits, the
United States Supreme Court stated, "[A] father, no less than a
mother, has a constitutionally protected right to the. . . 'custody
and management' of 'the children he has sired and raised ....
In Stanley v. Illinois,'2 which dealt with the custodial rights of un-
wed fathers, the Court stated, "The rights to conceive and raise
one's children have been deemed 'essential', 'basic civil rights of
man', and '[r]ights far more precious.., than property rights.' ",13
One can argue that part of a parent's right to raise a child and
direct a child's affairs is the right to exert influence over a child's
6. Id. at 579, 580, 376 N.E.2d at 1389, 1390.
7. Id. at 579, 376 N.E.2d at 1389-90.
8. See, e.g., Ex parte Bayliss, 550 So. 2d 986 (Ala. 1989); Neudecker v. Neudecker,
566 N.E.2d 557, 563-64 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d 592, 605-
06, 575 P.2d 201 (1978).
9. Kern v. Kern, 360 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); accord Sakovits v.
Sakovits, 178 N.J. Super. 623, 630, 429 A.2d 1091, 1095 (Ch. Div. 1981) (quoting Kern).
10. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
11. Id. at 652 (citations omitted).
12. 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that an unmarried father cannot be deprived of
custody of his children upon the death of the mother without a hearing).
13. Id. at 651.
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educational choices, including a determination of the level of finan-
cial support to be provided by the parent for a child's education.
The right of parents to direct their children's education was rec-
ognized in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 4 in which Amish parents were al-
lowed to withdraw their children from school after the eighth
grade, even though state laws required school attendance until age
sixteen. Yoder, however, was decided primarily on the basis of the
parents' rights of religious freedom rather than a general right of a
parent to direct a child's education. Thus, Yoder offers only mod-
erate assistance to parents who wish to assert a privacy interest in a
dispute over the level of support for a child's education.
Parents have a liberty interest in providing guidance for their
child's education, particularly when the parents are asked to pay
all or part of the educational expenses. However, the fact that a
liberty interest is involved does not end the inquiry. The United
States Supreme Court has recognized many liberty interests, but
nonetheless has allowed state statutes to override these interests
when there is a rational basis for doing so.15
Determining the constitutionality of a statute that requires sup-
port for a child's post-majority education could turn on the level of
scrutiny the court applies to the statute. If a minimal rationality
test is applied, an educational support statute is likely to be upheld
because the statute advances legitimate state interests, namely, fa-
cilitating education for children (including adult children) and
minimizing the effects of divorce on children. It should be noted
that divorced parents already are treated differently with regard to
financial matters than parents who are not divorced. For instance,
14. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
15. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990),
the Supreme Court stated that forced administration of life-sustaining medical treatment
implicates a liberty interest, but that the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit a state from
requiring clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent's wishes to withdraw life sup-
port before such support could be withdrawn. Id. at 2852. The majority opinion, written
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, said, "But determining that a person has a 'liberty interest'
under the Due Process Clause does not end the inquiry; 'whether respondent's constitu-
tional rights have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests
against the relevant state interests.'" Id. at 2851-52 (citations omitted).
In a footnote, the Cruzan Court discussed the difference between the terms "right" and
"interest." "Although many state courts have held that a right to refuse treatment is
encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of privacy, we have never so held. We
believe this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty
interest." Id. at 2851 n.7. Thus, under the Supreme Court's terminology, "liberty inter-
ests" receive considerably less protection than "rights." As such, a parent's desire to
exercise influence over a child's post-majority education by determining the level of sup-
port for that education is likely to be characterized as a "liberty interest" rather than a
"right."
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when parents divorce, the noncustodial parent's obligation of sup-
port for a minor child is set at a dollar amount by the court;' 6 in
contrast, a minor child in an intact marriage does not receive a
court order of support at a fixed dollar amount.
If, instead of applying a minimal rationality test, the court em-
ploys a strict scrutiny test, the court presumably will apply the
label of "fundamental right" to the parent's interest in raising his
or her child and extend the scope of that right to include a parent's
determination of educational support. In such an event, the statute
probably would be found unconstitutional on the ground that a
child's educational support is a matter of family privacy. As Pro-
fessor Gerald Gunther has observed, such a level of scrutiny usu-
ally is "strict" in theory and "fatal" in fact. 7
Courts, however, in deciding the level of support for a child's
education, are not likely to find that the parent's interest encom-
passes a fundamental right. The interest is important, but it does
not rise to the level of such well-established fundamental rights
such as the right to marry,18 to procreate,' 9 to hold religious be-
liefs,2° or to due process before complete loss of custody of one's
child.2' Those fundamental rights are related to the essence of the
intimate associations and beliefs in one's life. Whether or not a
parent decides to pay for a child's education is not as close to the
core of personhood and privacy as other rights which have been
held to be fundamental. The penumbra, so to speak, of the funda-
mental right to raise and manage one's child does not cast its
16. Illinois' guidelines for minimum amounts of child support are based on a percent-
age of the non-custodial parent's net income and the number of children, although the
financial resources of the custodial parent also may be considered. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
40, para. 505(a) (1989). Many other states explicitly consider the income of both parents
in determining guideline amounts of child support. See J. Atkinson, 2 MODERN CHILD
CUSTODY PRACTICE § 10.35 (1986 & Supp. 1990).
17. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972).
18. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (striking down a law against
interracial marriages).
19. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding the state can-
not make use of contraceptives by married persons a crime; nor can the state punish
someone for providing married persons with contraceptives or information about them);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-43 (1942) (invalidating a statute that provided
for the sterilization of persons convicted two or more times of "felonies involving moral
turpitude").
20. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (reversing convictions of
Jehovah's Witnesses for soliciting contributions without a state license).
21. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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shadow so far as to give fundamental-right protection to a parent's
decisions on post-majority educational support.
Although a parent's decision on post-majority support for the
child does not involve a fundamental right, a statute that mandates
such support should be subject to something more than a minimal
rationality test. The interests involved encompass not just an eco-
nomic issue, but also an issue of family privacy-the interests of a
parent in influencing a child's educational choices and allocating
family resources through the presence or absence of economic sup-
port. For such a blend of economic and privacy interests, a mid-
tier level of scrutiny is appropriate. As such, the statute must be
more than minimally related to a legitimate government interest.
The relationship must be "substantial" and the government inter-
est must be "important. 22
A post-majority support statute such as Illinois' would satisfy
that standard. Education of children and young adults is an im-
portant governmental interest. The future of our country in a
competitive world depends, in large measure, on quality education.
In addition, protecting children from the adverse effects of divorce
is also an important governmental interest, particularly when the
government is in the business of regulating divorces. A post-ma-
jority support statute is "substantially related" to that interest by
specifically allowing allocation of funds for a child's education.
The interest in family privacy is at least partially accommodated
by the Illinois statute. Paragraph 513 of the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act does not require post-majority sup-
port in all cases. Instead, the statute gives the court discretion to
order support after consideration of "all relevant factors. '23 Thus,
a parent who has a good reason for not supporting a child's post-
majority education (or not supporting the education at the level
desired by the child or other parent) could have that interest
honored by the court. Undoubtedly, many family members would
prefer not to have matters of family privacy aired and decided in
court, but it is the nature of divorce that some matters that for-
merly were decided within the privacy of the family move to a
more public forum.
The determination of the constitutionality of a post-majority ed-
ucational support statute is not changed by application of a mid-
tier level of scrutiny versus a minimal-rationality test. Under
22. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (invalidating a statute that applied dif-
ferent minimum drinking ages for males and females).
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 513 (1989), quoted in full supra note 1.
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either approach, the statute would be upheld. Nonetheless, the ap-
plication of a mid-tier level of scrutiny gives respect to the privacy
interests involved.
Further, respect for the privacy interest should carry over to the
trial court. Courts should not automatically order educational
support just because the parents can afford it and the child appar-
ently would benefit by additional education. Courts should ex-
amine a variety of factors relevant to family decision-making. For
example, if a mother and father had worked to support themselves
while in college and during their marriage, and the parents thought
that self-support would be a good experience for their children as
well, the court probably should honor that earlier decision in the
event that the issue subsequently is litigated. Most of the remain-
der of this Article, after a brief discussion of standing, will analyze
the factors that courts consider when determining post-majority
educational support.
III. STANDING
Either parent--custodial or noncustodial-may bring an action
to seek support for a child's educational expenses. However, there
seems to be a conflict in Illinois among the appellate courts regard-
ing whether a child can bring an action for educational support in
the child's own name. In Miller v. Miller,24 the Illinois Appellate
Court for the Third District held that an eighteen-year-old child
who sought support from both parents for his college education did
not have standing to bring an action under the Illinois Marriage
and Dissolution of Marriage Act. A similar result was reached in a
Second District case, In re Marriage of Garrison.25 In both Miller
and Garrison, the courts stated that the decision to give a child
standing to proceed against the child's parents for educational ex-
penses should be made by the legislature rather than the judiciary.
In a Fourth District case, however, an eighteen-year-old child
and his mother successfully brought an action against the father
for the child's college support, but the court did not specifically
address the issue of standing.26 Additionally, in a First District
decision, also entitled Miller v. Miller 27 (but involving different
parties than the Third District Miller case), a young man who had
reached the age of majority was found to have standing as a third-
24. 160 Il. App. 3d 354, 356-57, 513 N.E.2d 605, 607 (3d Dist. 1987).
25. 99 Ill. App. 3d 717, 425 N.E.2d 518 (2d Dist. 1981).
26. Wait v. Wait, 158 Ill. App. 3d 271, 273-74, 510 N.E.2d 600, 602 (4th Dist. 1987).
27. 163 Ill. App. 3d 602, 516 N.E.2d 837 (1st Dist. 1987).
1991]
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party beneficiary to enforce a settlement agreement between his
parents that provided for his college support. The parents in that
case purported to modify their settlement agreement so that the
mother received additional money in exchange for not requiring
the father to pay for their son's college education, as had been re-
quired by the initial agreement. The court held that this modifica-
tion was not enforceable against the son.28
This decision can be distinguished from the Third District Miller
case because the First District case involved an existing settlement
agreement that named the child as a beneficiary. In contrast, the
Third District case involved an attempt by a child to obtain sup-
port solely under paragraph 513 of the Act, not on the basis of an
existing agreement. In other words, the child who was the benefi-
ciary of the agreement had a vested interest in support that was not
afforded by the statute alone, although one could argue that both
children needed support. This conflict among appellate districts
continues because the Illinois Supreme Court has not ruled on the
issue of a child's standing to seek support.
IV. FACTORS FOR DETERMINING POST-MAJORITY CHILD
SUPPORT
A. Financial Resources of the Parents
"The financial resources of both parents" is the first enumerated
factor for consideration under paragraph 513 of the Act.29 The
Illinois Supreme Court has held that "[t]he court should not order
a parent to pay more for educational expenses than he or she can
afford. A party's ability to pay must be evaluated with regard to
the party's resources at the time of the hearing. ' 3° In the same
ruling, the court noted that the statute, with its use of the verb
"may," gives the trial court discretion on whether to order educa-
tional support. The statute does not require that all divorced par-
ents pay for their child's post-high school education. 31 Examples
of the relationship between parents' financial resources and the
level of support that is ordered by courts are presented throughout
this Section.
28. Id. at 620, 516 N.E.2d at 849.
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 513(a) (1989).
30. In re Support of Pearson, 111Ill1. 2d 545, 552, 490 N.E.2d 1274, 1277 (1986)
(citations omitted).
31. Id. at 551, 490 N.E.2d at 1277.
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B. Standard of Living; Educational Expenses of Older Children
The second enumerated factor in paragraph 513 is "the standard
of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been
dissolved. 32 In In re Support of Pearson,33 the court held that "the
most probative evidence of this factor" was what the parents had
spent for the education of their other children prior to dissolution
of the marriage.34 In Pearson, the father had a net income of
$28,000 per year and had spent, at most, $3,602 per year for his
older children's education. Thus, the court was not very sympa-
thetic to the mother, who sought $14,000 per year for two years for
their child to attend an out-of-state auto -mechanics school. The
supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision to set support at
$1,200 per year for two years because the evidence suggested the
child could attend a local community college's automotive school
for far less cost.
The "standard of living" factor referred to in paragraph 513 puts
the court in the position of trying to determine what the parents
would have contributed to their child's education had the parents'
marriage not ended. 3 In making this determination, the court
might consider the level and quality of education that the parents
received and the ambitions that the parents had for their children.
For example, if the parents are well-educated, they may have pro-
vided for their children to be similarly educated, at least had the
marriage remained intact. On the other hand, some parents may
have worked their way through school and expect their children to
do the same.
C. Financial Resources of the Child
The third enumerated factor in paragraph 513 is "the financial
resources of the child."' 36 The statute does not require that a child
help pay for his or her own education, but as a matter of practice,
most courts will expect a child to make some financial contribu-
tion. In one case, a father argued that his daughter should spend
more of her own personal assets on her education.37 The daughter
was the beneficiary of trust accounts worth approximately $8,000,
32. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 513(b) (1989).
33. 111 Ill. 2d 545, 490 N.E.2d 1274 (1986).
34. Id. at 551, 490 N.E.2d at 1277.
35. See generally Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 111. 2d 563, 580-81, 376 N.E.2d 1382,
1390 (1978).
36. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 513(c) (1989).
37. Larsen v. Larsen, 126 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1074, 468 N.E.2d 165, 167 (3d Dist.
1984).
Loyola University Law Journal
and she had a $10,000 joint checking account with her mother.
The court held that "[c]hildren of divorced parents are not re-
quired as a matter of law to spend their own funds in obtaining a
college education. Rather, the extent of a child's contribution is
left to the trial court's discretion .... Nonetheless, the appel-
late court noted with approval that the trial court had instructed
the child to apply $1,200 in earnings from her job at a McDonald's
restaurant toward her college expenses.
In another case, a father argued that his eighteen-year-old son
should apply for student loans to finance the son's education at
Washington University in St. Louis, the costs for which were about
$13,000 per year after subtraction of an educational grant.39 The
court held that it was well within the trial court's discretion to
order the father to pay $11,000 per year so that the son would not
have to incur substantial debt, especially since the father earned in
excess of $80,000 per year. The court also noted that the son was a
work-study student who worked twenty-five to forty hours per
week in the summer.4°
In another case, a father tried to argue his daughter's living ar-
rangement as a defense to a petition for educational support." The
father asserted that because his daughter was living with an un-
married friend, she was emancipated, and therefore he should not
have to pay her educational support. The court held that the
daughter's emancipation did not preclude support and her "living
situation [was] completely irrelevant to the issues at bar. '42
In commenting on the importance of a child making a contribu-
tion to his or her educational support, one appellate court referred
to the employment of a twenty-two-year-old student who was liv-
ing with his mother and said, "We think that his income should
have been devoted to obtaining his education and not to enhancing
38. Id.
39. Gribb v. Triezenberg, 188 Ill. App. 3d 695, 697, 544 N.E.2d 444, 448-49 (4th
Dist. 1989).
40. In In re Marriage of Korte, 193 Ill. App. 3d 243, 549 N.E.2d 906 (4th Dist.
1990), the court said, "we recognize that the child has a duty to lessen the parent's
financial burden of college expenses .... While loans for education are available, it
cannot be said that the trial court must in every case require the student to seek a loan."
Id. at 249, 549 N.E.2d at 910. In this case, the court noted the daughter had lessened her
parent's burden by attending a relatively inexpensive school, and the court ordered the
father to pay college support even though the daughter's process for seeking a loan had
not yet been completed. Id.
41. In re Marriage of Greenberg, 102 Ill. App. 3d 938, 429 N.E.2d 1334 (1st Dist.
1981).
42. Id. at 948, 429 N.E.2d at 1342.
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his lifestyle.14 3 In another case, a court commented that "[p]arents
are often called upon to make sacrifices to obtain a college educa-
tion for their children. But the children must also cooperate to
lessen the burden to their parents in whatever way they can.""
D. Public v. Private Institutions
The cost of attending a public educational institution is a bench-
mark in establishing educational support; nevertheless, a court
may order a parent to pay higher costs for a private institution if
the facts of a particular case so warrant. In In re Support of Pear-
son,45 the Illinois Supreme Court observed, "While in some in-
stances it may be proper for the court to provide for a child's
attendance at a private school, the child's access to a less expensive
public institution is a factor to be considered. '46 The mother in
Pearson sought to require the father to contribute to the costs of
their son attending a two-year Connecticut automotive school with
a tuition of $14,000 per year. The supreme court affirmed a trial
court decision that refused to require the father to pay such high
costs because Triton Community College, in Cook County, Illinois,
offered a similar program for $2,013 per year.. In addition, the
court noted that the father had a net income of only $28,000 per
year and $12,000 of that amount went to the mother as an alimony
payment. Therefore, educational support was set at $1,200 per
year.
Similarly, one father, an attorney, whose income decreased from
$96,000 to approximately $40,000, was not obliged to pay $30,000
or more per year to send his two children to the University of Cali-
fornia." In reversing and remanding the case, the appellate court
indicated that the appropriate frame of reference for determining
the father's educational support obligation, if any, was the cost of a
state school.
On the other hand, parents with higher incomes may indeed be
required to pay for private schools. In one case, a father with an
adjusted gross income of $47,000 per year was required to pay
$3,500 per semester for the full cost of his daughter's tuition and
43. In re Marriage of Brust, 145 Il. App. 3d 257, 262, 495 N.E.2d 133, 136 (5th Dist.
1986).
44. In re Marriage of Booth, 122 Ill. App. 2d 1, 6, 258 N.E.2d 834, 837 (1st Dist.
1970).
45. Ill Il. 2d 545, 490 N.E.2d 1274 (1986).
46. Id. at 551-52, 490 N.E.2d at 1277.
47. In re Marriage of Calisoff, 176 Ill. App. 3d 721, 729-30, 531 N.E.2d 810, 816-17
(1st Dist. 1988).
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board at Washington University in St. Louis.4" An additional fac-
tor in setting this level of support was that the father had earlier
acquiesced to his daughter attending that institution.49
A parent's relatively high income does not mean that the parent
will be obliged to pay for any private school that the child or the
child's custodial parent desires. In one case, a mother appealed
from an order that required the father to pay their daughter's edu-
cational expenses up to a maximum of what it would cost to send
their daughter to Mundelein College in Illinois for four years.
(Mundelein was the school in which their daughter currently was
enrolled.)50 The mother had argued against such a limit on sup-
port. In the words of the appellate court, "[The mother's] position
is basically that [the father] should be required to pay the cost of
whatever education Jacqueline wants, wherever she wants to get it,
for however long she wants, on whatever basis (full- or part-time)
she wants."'5
The appellate court upheld the order, fixed to the Mundelein
College rates, as reasonable and particularly appropriate. The
court observed that the mother previously had enrolled the daugh-
ter in the most expensive boarding school in Illinois without telling
the father and later had enrolled the child at Mundelein College
after her junior year of high school, again without telling the fa-
ther. (Mundelein was willing to accept the child on her academic
record without a high school diploma.)52
E. Allocating Educational Support Between the Parents
A moderately common approach to ordering educational sup-
port for a child is to require both parents to pay the child's ex-
penses in proportion to the parents' incomes. The order may
provide, either explicitly or implicitly, that child is responsible for
some portion of his or her educational expenses. For example, in a
Second District case, the appellate court affirmed an order in
which the father was to pay 65% of the children's education costs;
48. Greiman v. Friedman, 90 Ill. App. 3d 941, 946-47, 414 N.E.2d 77, 82 (1st Dist.
1980).
49. Id. at 947, 414 N.E.2d at 82; see also Gribb v. Triezenberg, 188 Ill. App. 3d 695,
702-03, 544 N.E.2d 444, 447 (4th Dist. 1989) (affirming an order that a father who earned
$77,000 per year pay $11,000 per year for his son to attend Washington University; total
costs of attending the University were approximately $13,000).
50. Ingrassia v. Ingrassia, 156 Ill. App. 3d 483, 493, 509 N.E.2d 729, 736 (2d Dist.
1987).
51. Id. at 493, 509 N.E.2d at 737.
52. Id. at 496-97, 509 N.E.2d at 737-38.
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the mother, 23%; and each daughter, 12%." The allocation be-
tween father and mother was in approximate proportion to their
incomes.
Although several courts have allocated support in proportion to
the parties' incomes, the Fourth District Appellate Court has held
that it is an abuse of discretion to apportion support based solely
on a ratio of the parties' gross incomes. In In re Marriage of Stock-
ton,5 4 the court stated that the amounts of support set by the trial
court may have been correct, but the method of arriving at these
figures was wrong. In remanding the case, the appellate court
sought to insure that all appropriate equitable factors, not just the
incomes of the parties, were considered.
In determining the responsibility of each parent for support, the
court also may consider the contribution of a parent who main-
tains a home for the child (usually the custodial parent). In one
case, a mother who had been the custodial parent before her
daughter went to college was not obliged to make cash payments in
direct support of her daughter's educational expenses." The court
noted that the mother purchased clothes for the daughter, laun-
dered the daughter's clothes when she came home from school,
and maintained a home where the daughter stayed during the
summer.
The issue of allocating support in proportion to income does not
arise if the parties enter into a settlement agreement which pro-
vides otherwise. If the parties previously agreed that one parent
would be fully responsible for college support, the agreement will
be enforced as long as it is conscionable and meets the child's rea-
sonable needs. The income of the party who is not obliged to pay
under the agreement will not be relevant, although that party's in-
come would be relevant in the absence of an agreement.5 6
F Impact of Second Families
A parent's obligations to a second family are a relevant consider-
53. In re Marriage of Sreenan, 81 111. App. 3d 1025, 1027-29, 402 N.E.2d 348, 350-52
(2d Dist. 1980); see also Taylor v. Luntz, 89 Ill. App. 3d 278, 283, 411 N.E.2d 950, 954
(4th Dist. 1980) (affirming an order in which the trial judge said that the allocation
between the parties was in proportion to their incomes).
54. 169 Ill. App. 3d 318, 523 N.E.2d 573 (4th Dist. 1988).
55. In re Marriage of Korte, 193 Ill. App. 3d 243, 249-50, 549 N.E.2d 906, 910-11
(4th Dist. 1990).
56. In re Marriage of Huston, 150 Il. App. 3d 608, 613-14, 501 N.E.2d 1015, 1019
(5th Dist. 1986); see also Larsen v. Larsen, 126 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1073, 468 N.E.2d 165,
167 (3rd Dist. 1984).
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ation in setting the educational support for children of a first mar-
riage.57  More than one court has observed, " 'Realistically,
defendant is obligated to support his present wife and child.' "58
On the other hand, there is old dictum to the effect that a parent
must meet the needs of a first family before meeting the needs of a
second family.59 Nevertheless, this dictum does not seem to be
currently followed by the courts, and a parent's obligations to a
second family are indeed a factor in setting support for a first fam-
ily, although this factor may not be controlling.
In some cases, a parent's remarrying may have a positive impact
on the parent's ability to pay educational support for children of a
first marriage. If a new spouse of a parent works and helps pay
family expenses, such as mortgage payments, property taxes, rent,
and utilities, the new spouse's contribution will help free the in-
come of the previously divorced parent to pay support to children
from the first marriage. Therefore, the consideration is relevant in
setting support.6°
G. Child's Academic Performance
A child's academic performance is another relevant factor in de-
termining educational support. A student who does well in school
increases his or her likelihood of receiving an order of support.6 1
Conversely, a student who performs poorly may receive no support
or a reduced level of support. In Greiman v. Friedman,62 the court
said, "Undoubtedly, there may be situations in which a court may
refuse to require a divorced parent to pay college expenses, as
where the student repeatedly demonstrates a lack of ability or in-
terest in his or her college pursuits. ' 63 Nevertheless, the court de-
clined to adopt an absolute rule that a divorced parent has no duty
to pay college expenses because of an allegedly poor academic per-
57. Greiman v. Friedman, 90 Ill. App. 3d 941, 948-49, 414 N.E.2d 77, 83 (1st Dist.
1980).
58. Id. at 948, 414 N.E.2d at 83 (quoting Tan v. Tan, 3 Ill. App. 3d 671, 675, 279
N.E.2d 486, 489 (1st Dist. 1972)).
59. See, e.g., Gregory v. Gregory, 52 Ill. App. 2d 262, 268, 202 N.E.2d 139, 143 (5th
Dist. 1964).
60. Wait v. Wait, 158 Ill. App. 3d 271, 273-74, 510 N.E.2d 600, 602 (4th Dist. 1987).
61. See, e.g., Willcutts v. Willcutts, 88 Ill. App. 3d 813, 820, 410 N.E.2d 1057, 1062
(3rd Dist 1980) ("[t]he evidence leaves no doubt that Brian [a biology major with an "A"
average] is a good student embarked upon a serious course of study and that he is deserv-
ing of the same financial assistance as his older brothers and sisters received in complet-
ing his college education").
62. 90 11. App. 3d 941, 414 N.E.2d 77 (1st Dist. 1980).
63. Id. at 946, 414 N.E.2d at 81-82.
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formance. The court, however, did indicate that it was appropriate
to condition the father's payments for one daughter on her main-
taining at least a "C" grade-point average. (The daughter had re-
ceived fifteen credit hours of "D's".) For another daughter, who
required an extra semester to finish college, the court held that it
was an appropriate exercise of discretion to require the parents to
pay only one-half of the cost for the extra semester and require the
daughter to pay the other half.
H. Quality of Relationship Between Parent and Child; Lack of
Consultation
The quality of the relationship between a child and the parent or
parents from whom support is sought is another factor in setting
educational support, but the absence of a good relationship will not
necessarily preclude support. In one Fourth District case, the
court held that the father's claim of "no relationship" with his son
could have been considered, and perhaps, should have been consid-
ered, by the trial court.64 Nonetheless, the trial court's failure to
do so was not reversible error. 65 Presumably, the worse the rela-
tionship or the more bad faith on the part of the child, the more
likely a court would be to reduce or eliminate educational support.
A related issue is a parent's complaint that he or she was not
adequately consulted about educational decisions. Courts have
held that the failure to consult with the parent from whom pay-
ment is sought can be a factor in setting the amount to be provided
by that parent, but the failure to consult will not automatically
result in the termination of support.66
V. USE OF TRUSTS FOR EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT
Paragraph 503(g) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act 67 permits a court to establish a trust for the benefit of
64. Gribb v. Triezenberg, 188 Ill. App. 3d 695, 701, 703, 544 N.E.2d 444, 446, 448
(4th Dist. 1989).
65. Id.;see also Willcutts, 88 111. App. 3d at 819, 820, 410 N.E.2d at 1062 (citing In re
Marriage of Sreenan, 81 111. App. 3d 1025, 1029, 402 N.E.2d 348, 352 (2d Dist. 1980) for
the proposition that "it is well settled that this obligation to contribute to educational
expenses is not conditioned upon a continued good relationship between parent and
child").
66. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
67. Paragraph 503(g) provides:
The court if necessary to protect and promote the best interests of the chil-
dren may set aside a portion of the jointly or separately held estates of the
parties in a separate fund or trust for the support, maintenance, education, and
general welfare of any minor, dependent, or incompetent child of the parties.
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the children out of the marital or non-marital property of the par-
ents. This paragraph, when combined with paragraph 513 of the
Act, permits a court to establish a trust for a child's post-majority
educational expenses.6" However, the fact that the parents have
ample funds is not a sufficient basis for establishing a trust. "[A]
trust can only be established if there is evidence showing a need to
protect the interests of the children. Section 503(g) also demands a
showing that the parent is unwilling or unable to make direct pay-
ments of support."6 9
Thus, in one case in which the father had not saved any of his
prior disability settlements (amounting to $170,000), the court or-
dered him to establish a $10,000 educational trust for his children
out of an upcoming disability payment,7 0 despite his expressed dis-
dain for higher education. The court further held, however, that to
the extent that the children did not use the funds for their educa-
tion, the funds would be returned to the father. Under the statute,
any unused funds could not be turned over to the adult children as
the trial court initially had ordered. 1
VI. EFFECT OF DEATH OF A PARENT
Paragraph 510(d) of the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage
Act, relating to the modification of child support payments, states,
"When a parent obligated to pay support dies, the amount of sup-
port may be modified, revoked or commuted to a lump sum pay-
ment, to the extent just and appropriate in the circumstances
.... "72 A First District case, In re Marriage of Treacy, held that if
a support order entered during the obligor's lifetime does not re-
quire the parent to pay educational support and does not expressly
reserve the issue, a court is without power to order support for
education after the obligor's death. 3
This ruling seems odd because neither the language of paragraph
510 nor paragraph 513 limit the power of a court to modify sup-
port to include educational support following the death of an obli-
gor. Indeed, the spirit of the Act seems to encourage granting
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 503(g) (1989).
68. In re Marriage of Harsey, 193 11. App. 3d 415, 419, 549 N.E.2d 995, 997 (5th
Dist. 1990).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 420-25, 549 N.E.2d at 997-1001.
71. Id. at 424-25, 549 N.E.2d at 1000-01.
72. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 510(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991).
73. In re Marriage of Treacy, 204 Il1. App. 3d 282, 289, 562 N.E.2d 266, 270 (1st
Dist. 1990).
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support for a child's post-majority education following the death of
an obligor, if the circumstances indicate such an order would be
"just and appropriate." In Treacy, the dissent persuasively argued
that "the fortuitous death of the parent controls the court's dispo-
sition, and the child is severely prejudiced. Such a result is not in
harmony with the legislature's intent to mitigate the harm to chil-
dren as a result of divorce. 74
The issue has not yet been ruled upon by the Illinois Supreme
Court. In the meantime, attorneys and judges who wish to leave
open the possibility of support for a child's post-majority education
would do well to make sure that the issue is explicitly reserved in
the court's support order.
VII. CONCLUSION
The obligation of a parent to pay for a child's education after
high school is not as strong as a parent's obligation to support a
child during the child's minority. Nonetheless, Illinois statutes
and case law provide that educational support can be ordered "as
equity may require." The factors that a court may consider are
many and the need for sensitivity is high as courts enter into an
issue that traditionally has been resolved privately by parents and
their children without outside intervention.
74. Id. (Jiganti, J., dissenting).

